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BOOK REVIEW
The Day the Milk Went Sour: Bridging Epistemology and
Ontology in Latour’s Empirical Philosophy
Bruno Latour, by Gerard de Vries, Polity, Cambridge, UK, 2016.
Students or scholars pursuing the philosophy of science, as a field of inquiry, once had a
life-time of reading and writing ahead of them. Science as a practice, as a cultural activity,
as employment, or as a political struggle were but deviations of the study of science as a
process, method, or vocation. The latter required little direct interaction with scientists,
and while it was, of course, never a bad idea, collecting empirical material – or data – was
not a requirement to do good philosophy. The era of armchair philosophy is coming –
or, according to others, has already come – to an end. The philosophy of science has
joined the history, sociology, and anthropology of science in employing empirical
modes of inquiry. This change was neither fast nor easy, and no single philosopher
can be credited for it. However, there is one whose name is inevitably mentioned in
this context, and that is Bruno Latour.
He is unquestionably a thinker deserving a space in Polity’s Key Thinkers series. His
work has been influential to several fields, from sociology to philosophy, from religious
studies to law. Gerard de Vries, in his book Latour, takes up what we consider to be a
very difficult challenge: reconstructing the development of Latour’s thinking by
showing a red line that, through contributions across nearly four decades, confers coher-
ence to his work: telling the tale of how Latour grew to be a philosopher and how phil-
osophy grew more empirical. The book is organised into six chapters, each focussing on
a specific period (and published work) of Latour’s career. The exposition is largely
chronological although some themes, as De Vries takes pains to show, consistently
recur in Latour’s production.
Here we introduce three discussion points, both as an evaluation of De Vries’ work
and as a reading aid for those attempting to digest De Vries’ reconstruction of Latour:
the context in which thinkers work, the disciplinary positioning of Latour including con-
sequences of this positioning, and De Vries’ display of Latour’s treatment of the relation-
ship between ontology and epistemology.
Thinkers in context
Key contemporary thinkers are not lonely geniuses. This is the impression we get from
De Vries once we start reading Latour. De Vries chronicles Latour’s path like Latour
himself chronicled that of Pasteur and Pasteur chronicled that of the microbes. Both
Latour and Pasteur are very capable at what they do – of course – but only capable
because they are not doing it all by themselves. De Vries quotes Latour: ‘I must go
looking for friends and allies, interest them, draw their attention’ (p. 63). De Vries
is unquestionably one of those friends and allies, yet the label ‘key contemporary
thinkers’ means that this group is significantly larger. Some of its members feature
in De Vries’ book by name or description, but most will diligently take up their
role as readers of the book – similar to the way they read some, or most, of
Latour’s work itself.
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In the opening chapter, De Vries takes pain to explain the intellectual struggle Latour
went through to position himself with respect to scholarly communities such as sociol-
ogists and anthropologists of science and philosophers of science. However, after the first
chapter, the surroundings of Latour fade into the background, and its philosophical
novelty is foregrounded, obscuring the context of its origin. This creates a tension in
the book: on the one hand the early work of Latour is contextualised with respect to
neighbouring communities, on the other hand, subsequent work of Latour is presented
more in isolation, as if he were this lonely genius.
As it unfolds through the pages, De Vries subjects Latour’s philosophy to trials.
Again, at least initially. Does it hold up? Does it compare favourably to competing epis-
temologies and ontologies? Not all trials are, at first at least, mastered successfully, as dis-
played by a page-long collection of critiques and dismissals of Irreductions. De Vries
argues why these critiques, to him and Latour, do not hold, but also admits that the pres-
entation of the arguments was, at that time, far from ideal. Latour’s alliance with the
sociology of science and knowledge was, in the beginning, helpful. It helped his ideas
spread, and his prestige and reputation grow. In De Vries’ reconstruction, however,
Latour aligned himself with an intellectual programme he was, in fact, leaving behind
– a claim that only makes sense with the benefit of hindsight. At the time, neither
Latour nor his critics could know this, although the discomfort flowing from the mis-
match may have been painfully obvious. Alas, we were not there.
Intersecting disciplines and approaches
The question of how to locate Latour in the constellation of disciplines interested in the
sciences is not independent of the question of how disciplines and approaches intersect.
It takes nearly half of the book to get to Actor-Network Theory (ANT). We have, by that
time, already gone through close to two decades of Latour’s thinking as reconstructed by
De Vries. Actants, intermediaries, mediators, and translations are introduced, allowing
the reader to see how exactly ANT differs from other competing approaches to under-
standing collectives, organisations, movements, or the social at large, as living networks
of moving relationships held together by an immense amount of work. The actions out
of which this work is built are, however, unknowns, part of what has to be explained and
understood alongside the connections that form the network that hosts the actions.
Through ANT, Latour reimagines sociology – if we can still use the word – as a
process of analysing group formation and action as they help build structures, consisting
of stabilised translations and their add-ons.
Though this revised and improved approach – developed by studying the sciences,
leading to new ways of understanding the fabric of the social – other practices can be
targeted too. Thus, Latour moves into the study of Law. Legal reasoning is an act of
work too, in which actions – speech actions, to be more precise – take place. There he
finds value-objects and conditions for their travel. The legal actor-network is different
from the scientific actor-network because of what circulates and what it produces –
the latter being either scientific facts or legal ties, the former being long lists of
different actors, materials, claims, utterances, and value-objects. What they both do is
travel well beyond the lab or courtroom, with science making everything scientific (or
the lab expanding into every crack of society), and the law making everything legal
(or the courtroom expanding into every crack of society).
Yet, for Latour, science and law are but shadows of the true adversary defying expla-
nation, or better perhaps, description is modernity itself. De Vries shows how Latour
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rewrites one of the seminal texts in the sociology of scientific knowledge to fit his phil-
osophy, where not eminent men but a small pump containing an even smaller feather at
the centre of a very large network of many other human and inhuman entities gave rise
to the modern constitution, separating nature from society. But it turns out we are ter-
rible at performing this separation, and continue to produce and rely on hybrids of both
all the time. By assigning those hybrids to either culture or nature, we purify their
history. Those hybrids and the ways in which they emerge, the roles they play in our
lives and in our societies, the collectives and networks they embody are assigned the
‘nature’ label. But what is worth focusing on in our complex world, De Vries writes,
are ‘hybrid thoughts in a hybrid world,’ precisely what, to borrow Latour’s famous
words, never allowed us to properly became modern. In this missed achieved of moder-
nity lies Latour’s complex intertwining of ontology and epistemology, as we explain next.
The relation between ontology and epistemology
Latour’s hybrids are histories of humans and non-humans, describing their existence
through time while it changes. They have a variable ontology. This allows Latour to
argue that it was only after Pasteur, and not before him, that lactic yeast that made
milk go sour. This relational ontology is a lot better than relativism – ‘poor man’s phil-
osophies’ (p. 135) – De Vries agrees. For Latour, the world is about relationships, not
about what relates to what. Why should we care? De Vries argues that those relation-
ships are causing upheaval and crisis in our world and we need tools to understand
them, rather than try and sweep them under the carpet. The issue is delicate, and ulti-
mately concerns the complex relation between ontology and epistemology – a tension
that is not just present in Latour’s work, but that has been at the centre of longstanding
philosophical debates.
De Vries seems to agree with Latour that we can easily dispose of epistemology and
move straightforwardly to ontology. Easier said than done, however, and perhaps puz-
zling that the issue is not problematised in De Vries’ reconstruction of Latour. One
could, in fact, wonder how an ‘empirical philosopher’ can make such a long jump
from epistemology to ontology, and whether in this jump something got lost, notably
the role of epistemic agents that interact with reality. What is at stake for empirical phil-
osophy in general, and for Latour in particular, is not so much the pluralist ontology, but
whether one can build an ontology in the abstraction of epistemology.
In the final and longest chapter, De Vries chronicles Latour’s gaze widening to prac-
tices far beyond science and the law. Almost reluctantly, De Vries introduces ‘beings-as-
beings’ and ‘beings-as-other,’ the latter being more interesting, surviving only when their
chain of translations is unbroken, when their relationship with others are fruitful and
their ability to face trials is unwavering. However, one might say, trials require judges.
Ontology requires epistemology and epistemic agents. Using ‘beings-as-other,’ for lack
of a better word, allows tracing different coexisting modes of existence for those
beings, making them ontologically plural. In the example, De Vries examines, a drug
can have a legal and a scientific mode of existence. Similarly, this plural ontology can
apply to everything, well beyond science.
Experience, De Vries argues, is to be at the heart of Latour’s approach to empirical
philosophy: ‘Empirical philosophy begins and ends with experience; but it acknowledges
that that in between a lot of thinking, sorting and work may have to be done’ (p. 169). In
this philosophy, the concept of construction no longer suffices. Latour replaces it with
‘instauration’, allowing him to include what yet has to happen into the chain of relations
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– the future, a promise that has to be looked after, cared for. The fact a scientist endea-
vours to build, the novel an author promised to write, they cause them to worry, blend-
ing the normative with the tangible and subjecting both to the empirical approach to
philosophy.
In the long list of modes of existence, different values travel through chains of trans-
lations, while in the process, all beings speak back, requiring us to care for, be responsible
for the chain of translations, whatever that chain transports, be it legal grounding, refer-
ence, love, or many others. De Vries reproduces Latour’s pivot table of modes of exist-
ence in full, concluding that after Latour abolished nature in his early work, and society
in his Reassembling the Social, he is repeating this with economy in An Inquiry into
Modes of Existence. Here too, contextualising Latour would have helped. There is only
a quick mention of Simondon in the text and Souriau is ignored completely. These
are the philosophers who started inquiring into modes of existence and that, arguably
belong to the school of thought Latour stems from. In fact, there is a broader story to
be told, about whether – or how – Latour’s complex thinking is embedded or originated
in the tradition of French epistemology, starting from Canguilhem and Bachelard.
Only towards the end does De Vries explicitly venture into asking what Latour’s work
provides us with, rather than describing or summarising it. The key elements, he argues,
are Latour’s ability to redescribe who we are without leaving something behind (or out),
including science, nature, power, lust, and others, that competing philosophies through-
out history have failed to capture. Latour is able to position the earth as a collective that is
ontologically plural – Gaia. The earth-as-a-plural collective consists of relationships,
associations, connections, and translations. It is a being-as-other that causes us to
worry, that requires our care and our responsibility. To De Vries, our old ideas of mod-
ernity, according to which nature and culture are clearly separable, cannot deliver those.
Latour’s empirical take on philosophy – one that does not include modernity – can.
Epistemological-ontological levels
What we seek from introductions into key contemporary thinkers is not why they are
right. Neither do we want to be baffled by their genius. Rather, we want to find out
how their thinking was received, both positively and negatively, and especially how it
changed the thinking of others. We would have hoped to encounter arguments that
demonstrate why Latour’s work is so innovative, so different – rather than mere
claims about it – preferably though discussions of debates surrounding Latour and
the reception of his work. Ultimately, we seek to learn from the receptions and critique
of Latour’s work as much as from its content.
Bruno Latour by Gerard de Vries is, as he writes in the preface, an introduction to
Latour’s work. Yet, De Vries argues that Latour expects the readers of An Inquiry into
Modes of Existence to know his work. Similarly, De Vries relies on previous knowledge
from his readers. It is difficult to imagine a reader totally unfamiliar with Latour, possibly
because of the multiple audiences having an interest in Latour. As a consequence, De
Vries’s Latour is not an immediate, nor an obvious, teaching resource. Rather, we
would suggest this is a companion reader to Latour – whose notable inaccessibility is dis-
played with humour by Twitter’s Bruno @LatourBot, tweeting translated sentences from
Latour’s work which (in isolation) make no sense whatsoever.
Despite this, the book offers numerous interesting leads for philosophers of science or
those engaged in science studies. First, the intellectual biography of Latour shows us that
disciplinary boundaries neither are, nor should be, impenetrable. Of course, they are not
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absent, for they imply different epistemic agents, conceptual tools, core concepts and, to
a lesser degree, institutionalisations. However, historians, sociologists, anthropologists,
philosophers can strengthen their dialogues across these semi-permeable boundaries.
The primary intellectual disputes currently limiting such exchange are the unclear
translations between epistemological and ontological levels. Latour’s attempt to build
a trading zone between them, centring on modes of inquiry, is but the very first step.
Second, we need to ask ourselves what the added value of the label ‘empirical philosophy’
is. Does the prefix influence the chances of constructive and favourable interactions
across disciplinary boundaries? We would argue so. The label ‘empirical,’, however,
has to be contextualised in developments in our respective fields. It is an adjective
that is assumed and rarely qualified in STS, indicating its commonality, whereas it
invites mainly questions in the philosophy of science. What this reconstruction of
Latour’s work brings us, therefore, is a rationale for an empirical approach; such
approach may be perceived as uncomfortable – and yet necessary – by those sitting in
either camp: ethnography or philosophy, epistemology, or ontology.
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